32-bit TriCore™ AURIX™ microcontroller

About this document

Scope and purpose

As requirements from functional safety standards in automotive, industrial and other fields are a challenging subject, this document intends to provide a first set of guidelines for users who are unfamiliar using the AURIX™ TC3xx microcontroller unit (MCU) in a functional safety scope.

This application note is part of a series of document named "FuSa in a nutshell" as listed in

5

.

Intended audience

This document is intended for all those evaluating the AURIX™ TC3xx MCU, including functional safety engineers on the customer side and application engineers. This includes designers of safety-related systems who:

  • Are new to functional safety

  • Want to know more about functional safety (also called "FuSa") applications

  • Want to understand in principle how functional safety can be implemented with hardware support

  • Are looking for functional safety details that cannot be found in the MCU user manual

Structure of the document

This document wants to provide a first guidance on the following safety related arguments:

  • Electric Power Steering system and safety considerations

  • Chip set for an ASIL D use case

  • New trends

Disclaimer

Information include in ths document are for training purposes only and are not to be taken as a blueprint for productive development.

Introduction

To better understand how AURIX™ TC3xx safety features are employed, it is important to discuss a typical application from the automotive sector (an electric power steering (EPS)). A complete chipset, meeting ISO 26262 requirements and supporting fail-safe EPS systems, will be described.

Note: High availability and fail-operational reliability can be achieved by adding a redundant functional system.

The EPS system assists a driver to steer the vehicle with less manual force. The application example of an EPS solution is presented in

Figure 1

.

Figure 1. EPS application example


The electronic control unit (ECU) directly controls an electric brushless direct current (BLDC) motor with 3, 6 or 12 phases, which applies additional torque or force to the steering column or directly to the steering rack. The main hazard is “unwanted steering” which is detected within a fault-tolerant time interval of in the order of milliseconds. The ASIL rating assigned is D.

The critical safety hazard "unwanted steering" comprises faults that lead to unintended generation of torque or moves by the BLDC motor that may lead to steering the vehicle in a hazardous direction. In the event of a detected error, the EPS system will inform the driver with a warning and the driver must be able to control the vehicle manually without interference from the EPS system.

Figure 2. Simplified block diagram of an EPS system


To perform specific tasks, such as steering angle measurement and electric motor control, a number of dedicated integrated circuits are utilized, which are discussed in the subsequent sections. Moreover, their requirements in terms of functionalities and safety-related specifications are described.

Initial assumptions

This example does not cover the steer-by-wire use case; therefore, mechanical steering is considered to be still present. However, the basic requirements for a fail-safe EPS also apply in steer-by-wire systems for each of the redundant functional channels.

Need for protection

EPS uses an electric motor to assist in the steering of a vehicle. A sensor detects the torque exerted on the steering wheel by the driver and an ECU applies assisted torque via the motor. The mechanical linkage between the steering wheel and the steering gear is retained as a backup, so the driver can manually steer the car.

System safe state:

Current flow to the motor is cut off and the motor remains in freewheeling (phase cut-off or active freewheeling). Fail operational may be required, especially for heavy vehicles.

Note: To have a high-availability use case, the example available in this section needs to be reviewed using redundancy.

The EPS system description is represented in

Figure 2

. The main block is the AURIX™ TC3xx microprocessor, which handles and controls all the major functionalities.

Hardware components

The major requirements and the key features of the selected components are:

  • Safe system supply optimized for EPS with ASIL-D monitoring and supervision

  • Safe bridge driver, optimal for EPS and brake booster, supporting ASIL-D for safe state off

  • ISO 26262 compliant angle sensor, torque sensor and motor position sensors designed for most demanding safety applications (ASIL-D) with superior accuracy performance

  • Robust MOSFET with superior switching behavior

  • AURIX™ TC3xx- microcontroller that needs to guarantee safe calculation because the output values of the control algorithms heavily influence the generation and control of the BLDC motor. In addition, PWM signals (typically at 20 kHz) for the high side and the low side switches of the half bridge drivers need to be provided safely by the MCU, as well as the SPI for communication with the power supply and watchdog

  • Current sensors are applied for torque control loops and use multiple redundant ADC channels and converters, for example, dual sensing of 1-3 shunts, using a 4th or using a SPI interface to bridge driver ASICs

  • CAN (FD) messages for steering angle signal values transmitted outside of the ECU

  • CAN (FD) and FlexRay (optional) for getting commands in steer-by-wire systems (for example, ADAS commands)

Power supply

The power management IC device can manage and monitor the power supply for a range of ECU component systems, including electric power steering, engine control units and advanced driver assistance systems.

An important functional safety feature of this integrated circuit is its ability to detect and report faults in the power supply rails, such as overvoltage, undervoltage and overcurrent conditions.

The device includes a range of built-in protection mechanisms, such as voltage and current clamping, to help to prevent damage to sensitive electronic components in the event of a fault.

The power supply circuit also includes several features to ensure reliable and stable power delivery to critical vehicle systems, including multiple regulated outputs. Each of those can be programmed to a specific voltage and current limit.

Another very relevant safety feature is the presence of a watchdog timer to monitor the system for malfunctions and automatically reset the device if necessary.

In addition to its functional safety features, a good power supply integrated circuit is designed to be highly efficient and reliable. The device need to be capable of operating at high temperatures and includes advanced thermal protection features to prevent damage from overheating. An example of such an IC is the TLF35584 presented in

Figure 3

.

Figure 3. Safety connections of the power supply module (besides needed supplies)

Pinout AURIX™ TC3xx-PMIC

Table 1

lists an example of connections required for functional and safety purposes when using

TLF35584

as the power supply chip for an EPS system. It is necessary to go to the Infineon website to check which is the most appropriate and up-to-date chip variant before making any decision about the project.

Table 1. AURIX™ TC3xx-TLF35584 connections

NR

AURIX™

PMIC

Description

1

DATA_IN (RX)

MISO (SDO)

Digital SPI signaling output port refers to the VEXT supply voltage. Connect to the SPI port “data input” of the MCU.

2

DATA_OUT (TX)

MOSI (SDI)

Digital SPI signaling input port refers to the VEXT supply voltage. Connect to the SPI port “data output” of the MCU.

3

CHIP SELECT

CSN (SCS)

Digital active-low SPI signaling input port refers to the VEXT supply voltage. Connect to the SPI port “chip select” of the MCU.

4

CLOCK

CLK_SPI (SCL)

Digital SPI signaling input port refers to the VEXT supply voltage. Connect to the SPI port “clock” of the MCU.

5

FSP

ERR

Diagnostic output signal from AURIX™ TC3xx to TLF to activate an independent safety path.

6

ESR1

INT

Safety output to AURIX™ TC3xx

7

PORTX.Y

WDI

Watchdog input signal from AURIX™ TC3xx

8

PORST

ROT

Reset to AURIX™ TC3xx

9

PORTA.B

SS1

For the startup test of SS1 output effectiveness (optional)

10

PORTC.D

SS2

For the startup test of SS2 output effectiveness (optional)

3-phase bridge driver

A gate driver IC is dedicated to controlling six external N-channel MOSFETs, forming an inverter for 3-phase motor drives. Such chips are often referred to as gate driver units (GDUs). An example of a block diagram of such an integrated circuit can be seen in

Figure 4

.

Figure 4. Infineon TLE9183QK gate driver connection


From a functional safety perspective, a three-phase driver must include safety features to prevent dangerous situations from occurring in the event of faults.

Some of the key safety features that are typically included in a three-phase gate driver are:

  • Short-circuit protection of the motor winding

  • Chip overtemperature protection

  • Chip under-voltage protection

  • Overcurrent protection of the motor winding: The internal current amplifier is a circuit that measures the current flowing through the motor windings and amplifies the signal to a level that can be read by the device's control circuitry to ensure safe and reliable operation of the motor

  • Diagnostic features for chip health management

Pinout AURIX™ TC3xx to the gate driver

Table 2

shows the connections required for functional and safety purposes when using TLE9183QK as the 3-phase motor driver chip. It is necessary to visit the Infineon website to check which is the most appropriate and up-to-date device before making any decisions about the project.

Table 2. AURIX™ TC3xx-TLE9183QK connections

NR

AURIX™

Gate driver

Description

1

DATA_IN (RX)

MISO (SDO)

Digital SPI signaling output port refers to the VEXT supply voltage. Connect to the SPI port “data input” of the MCU.

2

DATA_OUT (TX)

MOSI (SDI)

Digital SPI signaling input port refers to the VEXT supply voltage. Connect to the SPI port “data output” of the MCU.

3

CHIP SELECT

CSN (SCS)

Digital active-low SPI signaling input port refers to the VEXT supply voltage. Connect to the SPI port “chip select” of the MCU.

4

CLOCK

CLK_SPI (SCL)

Digital SPI signaling input port refers to the VEXT supply voltage. Connect to the SPI port “clock” of the MCU.

5

GTM TOM module

IH1_N

AURIX™ PWM output, TOM channel of the GTM timer

5

GTM TOM module

IH2_N

AURIX™ PWM output, TOM channel of the GTM timer

1

6

GTM TOM module

IH3_N

AURIX™ PWM output, TOM channel of the GTM timer

1

7

GTM TOM module

IL1

AURIX™ PWM output, TOM channel of the GTM timer

1

8

GTM TOM module

IL2

AURIX™ PWM output, TOM channel of the GTM timer

1

9

GTM TOM module

IL3

AURIX™ PWM output, TOM channel of the GTM timer

1

10

ADC module

VRO

AURIX™ ADC input; voltage reference output: The DC output voltage at the outputs of the CSAs (VOx) for zero differential input voltage is defined by the output of the reference buffer at pin VRO.

11

ADC module Z1

VO1

Analog output of current sense amplifier 1 for shunt signal amplification, goes to ADC module Z1 of AURIX™.

For functional reasons (synchronization), keep Z1≠Z2; Z2≠Z3; and Z1≠Z3

12

ADC module Z2

VO2

Analog output of current sense amplifier 2 for shunt signal amplification, goes to ADC module Z2 of AURIX™.

For functional reasons (synchronization), keep Z1≠Z2; Z2≠Z3; and Z1≠Z3

13

ADC module Z3

VO3

Analog output of current sense amplifier 3 for shunt signal amplification, goes to ADC module Z3 of AURIX™.

For functional reasons (synchronization), keep Z1≠Z2; Z2≠Z3; and Z1≠Z3

14

PORTx.A

ERR_N

Input to the MCU for diagnostic purposes

15

PORTy.B

ENA

Enable bridge driver

When set to "low", output stages of the gate driver are turned OFF and remain off. Low to high transitions trigger a reset of device-latched errors.

_

_

SOFF_N

Safe Off Not: Switch off paths independent of ENA.

Analog active low input pin for external triggering of device safe state. It does not cause the reset of error registers.

_

_

INH_N

Analog active-low inhibit pin.

Sets the device into sleep mode for low quiescent current consumption.

External FETs are turned off actively before the charge pumps are turned off.

Resetting via inhibit requires a new configuration via SPI.

_

_

PFBx

Phase feedback: Not connected to the MCU in this use case

Note: A PWM clock source plausibility check must be considered.

Sensors and their position

A typical EPS includes a set of sensors to read the motor position, the steering angle and the steering torque, as shown in

Figure 5

.

Figure 5. Sensors position


Torque sensor

The steering torque sensor measures the torque exerted on the steering wheel by the driver. Its signal is fed into the ECU and used to regulate the amount of assisting torque provided by the motor. The torque sensor in this example uses a diverse redundancy such that faults can be detected, for example, using an inverse sensing scheme between the two redundant channels. Torque sensors typically communicate with the AURIX™ TC3xx using the SENT protocol.

An example of a torque sensor is the Infineon hall-based magnetic sensor TLE4999C8, designed for torque sensing applications. One of the key functional safety features is the ability to detect and report faults in the sensor output. This can be achieved through a combination of redundant signal processing and built-in self-test mechanisms.

The redundant signal processing ensures that two independent sensing elements are used to generate differential output signals. These signals can then be compared by the MCU, which does a plausibility check to detect any issue in the measurement chain. The built-in self-test mechanisms allow the sensor to periodically test its own internal components and report any errors or faults to the system control unit.

Figure 6. Dual-die hall-based magnetic sensor characteristic

Another important functional safety feature of the sensor is its ability to withstand harsh environmental conditions, such as high temperatures, humidity and vibration. This can be achieved using specialized packaging and sealing techniques, as well as the integration of built-in protection features such as overvoltage and reverse-polarity protection.

To be easily integrated with other components of the system, such as MCUs and motor drivers, the sensor features a bus-capable digital short-PWM-code (SPC) interface (similar to SENT), which can be easily configured.

Pinout AURIX™ TC3xx to the torque sensor

Figure 7. Infineon TLE4999C8 torque sensor schematic and data example

Table 3

shows the connection that is needed for functional and safety purposes when using TLE4999C8 as a torque sensor chip. It is necessary to visit the Infineon website to check which is the most appropriate and up-to-date chip before making any decisions about the project.

Table 3. AURIX™ TC3xx-TLE4999C8 connections

NR

AURIX™

Torque sensor

Description

1

SENT

SPC

The two sensor outputs are transmitted using the SPC protocol.

Figure 8. Sensor communication to AURIX™ TC3xx via SPC protocol

Steering angle sensor (SAS)

The steering angle sensor is typically mounted at the top of the steering column, close to the steering wheel inside the passenger compartment. It is not required for the basic functionality of the EPS system, but it is required for the electronic stability program (ESP), which assists the driver in critical driving conditions. It usually communicates via SENT or SPI to the MCU.

Some of the key safety features for a steering angle sensor in an EPS application are:

  • Redundancy:

    The SAS should have redundant sensor elements and signal processing circuitry to provide reliable operation in case of a single-point failure. This redundancy can ensure that the sensor continues to operate safely and accurately even in the event of a failure in one of the sensor elements.

  • Diagnostic coverage:

    Both internal self-diagnostics and external system-level diagnostics (see below explanation)

  • Accuracy:

    The SAS should provide accurate and reliable position sensing to ensure that the EPS system operates safely and predictably.

Figure 9. Dual-die angle output of the steering angle sensor

For the above use cases, it uses a dual-die implementation, that is, two fully redundant measurement outputs in one package. In this example, for both chip 1 and chip 2, two different SENT connections are present to transmit the angle sensor measurement; one pin of each chip is the interface for channel 1 and a second pin of each chip is the interface for channel 2. For each single chip, the MCU will take care of a plausibility check to ensure that the two measures are coherent. In addition, another plausibility check is performed to evaluate the information coming from the two different chips and correlate it.

Figure 10. Two outputs from two dual-die-angle sensors

Pinout AURIX™ TC3xx to the steering angle sensor

Table 4

lists an example of connections needed for functional and safety purposes when using the TLE5014D angle sensor chip with SENT configuration. It is necessary to go to the Infineon website to check which is the most appropriate and up-to-date chip before making any decisions about the project.

Table 4. AURIX™ TC3xx-TLE5014D connections

NR

AURIX™

Angle sensor

Description

1

SENT 1

Chip 1 IFB-1

Input to MCU - SENT/SPC/PWM/SICI interface for channel 1

First redundant sensor

2

SENT 2

Chip 1 IFB-2

Input to MCU - SENT/SPC/PWM/SICI interface for channel 2

First redundant sensor

3

SENT 3

Chip 2 IFB-1

Input to MCU - SENT/SPC/PWM/SICI interface for channel 1

Second redundant sensor

4

SENT 4

Chip 2 IFB-2

Input to MCU - SENT/SPC/PWM/SICI interface for channel 2

Second redundant sensor

Figure 11. Sensor communication to AURIX™ TC3xx via SENT

Rotor position sensor

The rotor position sensor is mounted directly at the end of the shaft of the EPS motor, which is commonly a highly efficient BLDC motor. It can use multiple analog signals (sin and cos, resolver) or a digital signal (SENT). There are multiple options for sensing the motor position, for example, magnetic sensors, resolvers and encoders.

Figure 12. Infineon TLE5309A16(D) rotor position sensor wiring diagram

Figure 13. Example of a rotor position sensor with redundancy and diversity

One way to sense motor position is to use a sensor that includes two independent sensing elements, with each element providing a single/differential output signal for both the sine and cosine components of the magnetic field. This results in a total of two/four signals, with one/two sets of redundant signals for each component. The redundant single/differential signals for the sine and cosine components provide several benefits for functional safety.

The bottom sensor element is an anisotropic magnetoresistance (AMR) sensor. Therefore, in the angle range of 180° to 360° of the

giant magnetoresistance

(GMR) sensor, the AMR sensor output signal will be in the range of 0° to 180° again. This is represented by the blue line in

Figure 13

.

In case a diverse output of the two sensors is desired, the connections to the SIN_N and SIN_P or COS_N and COS_P pins on the printed circuit board can be interchanged. The consequence of this change of connections is that either the differential sine or the cosine signal is inverted, as represented by the dotted blue line in

Figure 13

.

If differential signaling is used (8 connections instead of 4), this can reduce the effects of electromagnetic interference (EMI) on the signal, which can improve the accuracy and reliability of the sensor. This solution also provides a redundancy feature that can help detect and isolate faults in the signal.

Pinout AURIX™ TC3xx to the rotor position sensor

Table 5

lists an example of connections needed for functional and safety purposes when using TLE5309A16(D) as a rotor position sensor chip. It is necessary to go to the Infineon website to check which is the most appropriate and up-to-date chip before making any decisions about the project.

The TLE5309A16(D) sensor can be used in single-ended or differential output mode.

Figure 13

shows a typical application circuit for the TLE5309A16(D) in single-ended output mode using the positive output channels. For single-ended operation, positive or negative output channels can be used. Unused single-ended output pins should preferably be floating or connected to GND with a high-ohmic resistance (>100 kΩ). The TLE5309A16(D) contains separate supply pins for the GMR sensor and the AMR sensor.

Table 5. AURIX™ TC3xx-TLE5309A16(D) connections

NR

AURIX™

Rotor position sensor

Description

1

DSADCX_a

SIN_P1

Input to cluster X of DSADC

2

DSADCX_b

COS_P1

Input to cluster X of DSADC

3

DSADCY_a

SIN_P2

Input to cluster Y of DSADC

4

DSADCY_b

COS_P2

Input to cluster Y of DSADC

5

EVADCZ1.a

VDIAG1

Input to cluster Z1 of DSADC

6

EVADCZ2.b

VDIAG2

Input to cluster Z2 of DSADC

Note: To be able to detect any common-cause failure coming from the MCU, it is recommended that X≠Y and Z1≠Z2. In other words, there must be enough independence between the two redundant ADC acquisitions (P1 and P2) and the same is true for the VDIAGx signal. Separation between sin_P1 and sin_P2, cos_P1 and cos_P2, VDIAG1 and VDIAG2 pins also need to be considered, as explained in 1 ..

CAN transceiver

To enable the EPS to interact with the entire car system, an integrated circuit that provides the CAN physical layer is needed. For this reason, a CAN transceiver IC must be selected to enable the AURIX™ TC3xx MCU to communicate using the specific bus protocol.

Some of the key features of a robust CAN transceiver are:

  • Low current consumption allows the system to accomplish the CAN communication with a small power budget

  • Fail-safe features such as TxD time-out, RxD recessive clamping (that is, fail-safe feature that prevents sending data on the bus if the RxD line is clamped to high) and overtemperature shut-down allow the system to behave in a predictable manner in safety-critical situations. Other safety measures also report the CAN short circuit proof to ground, battery and VCC, as well as undervoltage detection for the supply voltages

  • Local failure diagnostics should also be implemented by specifically designed output pins

This IC should be chosen by considering the earlier mentioned characteristics to allow for a safe and reliable communication with the system, as mentioned in

6

.

Figure 14. CAN TLE9252V transceiver pinout

Pinout AURIX™ TC3xx-CAN transceiver

Table 6

shows the AURIX™ TC3xx-TLE9252V connections.

Table 6. AURIX™ TC3xx-TLE9252V connections

NR

AURIX™

CAN

Description

1

_

CANH

Output of the transceiver to the CAN bus line

2

_

CANL

Output of the transceiver to the CAN bus line

3

PORTX1.A1

NERR

Error flag output, failure and wake-up indication

4

PORTX2.A2

WAKE

Input, sensitive to rising and falling edges

5

PORTX3.A3

NSTB

Standby control input

6

_

INH

Output from external control circuitry—not to be connected to the MCU

7

CAN RX

RxD

Receive data output from the MCU

8

CAN TX

TxD

Transmit data input from the MCU

FlexRay communication (optional)

FlexRay is often used instead of CAN in applications where high data transfer rates, deterministic communication and fault tolerance are critical. CAN is a widely used communication protocol in the automotive industry and is suitable for many applications, but it has some limitations that make it less than ideal for safety-critical systems.

One of the key advantages of FlexRay over CAN is its higher data transfer rates. FlexRay supports data transfer rates of up to 10 Mbps, which is significantly faster than the bit rate supported by CAN. This makes FlexRay ideal for applications where large amounts of data need to be transferred quickly and reliably, such as in advanced driver assistance systems (ADAS) and autonomous vehicles.

Another advantage of FlexRay is its deterministic communication. Unlike CAN, which uses a non-deterministic arbitration scheme to resolve conflicts between nodes competing for access to the bus, FlexRay uses a deterministic scheduling scheme that guarantees message transmission times and latencies. This is important for safety-critical systems, where timing is critical and unpredictable latencies can lead to system failures.

FlexRay is also designed to be fault-tolerant, which means that it can continue to operate even if one or more nodes in the network fail. This is important for safety-critical systems, where a single failure can have dangerous consequences.

Some examples of communications in a car that may be implemented using FlexRay instead of CAN include:

  • Advanced driver assistance systems (ADAS):

    FlexRay can be used to transmit sensor data (for example, radar, lidar, camera) to an ADAS control unit for processing and decision-making

  • Brake-by-wire systems:

    FlexRay can be used to transmit signals from the brake pedal to the brake actuator, providing a more responsive and reliable braking system

  • Electric power steering (EPS) systems:

    FlexRay can be used to transmit steering angle and torque data between the EPS control unit and the steering motor, allowing for precise and accurate steering control

  • Active suspension systems:

    FlexRay can be used to transmit data between suspension sensors and the suspension control unit, allowing for real-time adjustment of the suspension system

CAN is still widely used in many automotive applications and is often the preferred choice for simpler, less demanding communication tasks; however, for safety-critical systems or applications that require higher performance, more robust communication and deterministic timing, FlexRay may be a better option.

Summary

It is important highlighting that it is not possible to add safety features in the last phase of the project development; otherwise, it can be that the MCU does not have enough resources in terms of GPIO and peripherals for redundancy. The correct set of safety features needs to be established at the time the MCU is chosen; otherwise, important safety mechanisms can be missing.

This section underlines that the choice of the correct chipset that is used in a safety application requires a good knowledge of application-related risks, safety goals and safety measures required by each specific functionality.

For automated driving vehicles or for heavy vehicles, the EPS system must be highly available (ISO 26262: safety-related availability). Typically, two EPS systems are used to achieve fail-safe operational steering. These systems individually apply the same safety methods listed above. The two EPS chipsets either operate in parallel or operate in “hot standby” for the second channel.

In case one channel detects an error, it will stop operation (fail silent). However, in contrast to the standard, there are mechanisms installed that automatically detect a fail silent situation on the other channel, such that the remaining channel can take over the full operation and report the situation to higher-level systems, informing the driver.

Figure 15. Transition from Fail-Safe to Fault-Tolerant EPS

References

  1. Infineon Technologies AG:

    AURIX™ TC3xx User's Manual

    ; 81726 Munich; 2021-02; Available online

  2. Infineon Technologies AG:

    TriCore™ TC1.6.2 core architecture manual

    ; Available online

  3. ISO 26262:2018 Road vehicles- Functional safety

    ; Available online

  4. IEC 61508:2010 Functional safety of electrical/electronic/programmable electronic safety-related systems

    ; Available online

  5. Infineon Technologies AG:

    AN1000 - FuSa in a Nutshell - release note

    ; Available online

  6. Infineon Technologies AG:

    AN1002 - FuSa in a Nutshell - Introduction to AURIX™ TC3xx functional safety

    ; Available online

Glossary

Table 7. Glossary

Definition

Description

Notes

ASC

Active Short Circuit

in the Inverter Use Case

Architectural Element

The smallest element on which the FMEDA is performed

ASIL

Automotive Safety Integrity Level; refer to ISO 26262-1:2018, 3.6

BEV

Battery-powered Electric Vehicle

CCF

Common-Cause Failure; refer to ISO 26262-1:2018, 3.18

DC

Diagnostic Coverage; refer to ISO 26262-1:2018, 3.33

DFA

Dependent Failure Analysis identifies single events that can cause multiple sub-parts to malfunction (for example, intended function and its safety mechanism) and lead to a violation of a safety requirement or safety goal.

DMI

Data Memory Interface

DPF

Dual-Point Failure; for the definition refer to ISO 26262-1:2018, clause 3.38

DSPR

Data Scratch Pad RAM

ECU

Electronic Control Unit

FHTI

Fault Handling Time Interval is defined in ISO 26262 as the sum of three elements: The fault detection time, the fault reaction time and the time for the system to reach a safe state.

FTTI

Fault Tolerant Time Interval; for the definition refer to ISO 26262-1:2018, clause 3.61

FMEA

Failure Mode and Effects Analysis

FMEDA

Failure Modes, Effects and Diagnostic Analysis

Analysis of the effect of random hardware faults on a safety requirement or safety goal, including quantitative estimation of failure rates and the probability/rate of a safety goal violation

Quantitative

Bottom-up

HW only

FTA

Fault Tree Analysis

Analysis in which a top-level failure mode is broken down to a combination of lower-level faults (root causes) using a Boolean logic approach

Qualitative (may be quantitative)

Top-down

HW only

HARA

Hazard Analysis and Risk Assessment; Refer to ISO 26262-1:2018, 3.76

HW

Hardware

IC

Integrated Circuit

IEC

International Electrotechnical Commission

ISO

International Organization for Standardization

LBIST

Logic Built-in Self Test

LMU

Local Bus Memory Unit

MCU

Microcontroller unit

MMIC

Monolithic Microwave Integrated Circuit is a type of integrated circuit (IC) device that operates at microwave frequencies (300 MHz to 300 GHz). These devices typically perform functions such as microwave mixing, power amplification, low-noise amplification and high-frequency switching.

PMI

Program Memory Interface

PMIC

Power Management ICs (PMICs)

PMSM

Permanent Magnet Synchronous Machine (with rare earth material)

Motor type

PSPR

Program Scratch Pad RAM

Safety Flip Flops (SFF’s)

Safety flip-flops are special flip-flops that implement a hardware mechanism capable of detecting bit flips within the protected registers, thus preventing single-point faults.

Safety Measure

Activity or technical solution to prevent, detect, control or mitigate systematic and random failures.

SBC

system basis chips (SBC)

SBCs combine mainly three functionalities in a single device: Power supply, CAN and/or LIN transceivers and supporting features (MCU supervision, SPI interface and so on). This integration makes SBC a potentially better alternative to standalone (discrete) solutions, especially in terms of total solution cost and total area.

SE

Soft Error

SM

Safety Mechanism: for the definition refer to ISO 26262-1:2018, 3.142

SW

Software

SPU

Signal Processing Unit

STP

Shoot-Through Protection: Protection typical of an inverter gate driver so that the high side and the low side of the three-phase motor legs cannot be activated simultaneously

VCU

Vehicle Control Unit

Revision history

Document revision

Date

Description of changes

V1.0

2024-09-12

Initial release

V1.1

2025-05-28

Template update

Updated the document title

1

Even if it is possible to connect IHx_N and ILx to the same MCU pin because the gate driver itself provides the negation of IHx_N with respect to ILx, for better performances, it is preferable to keep IHx_N not connected to ILx so that dead time can be customized.